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FROM ECONOMIC DISASTER TOWARD RECOVERY AND RENEWED DEVELOPMENT: 
Toward African Action
By Reginald Herbold Green
To plan is to choose,
Choose to go forward.
- President J. K. Nyerere
Pessimism of the intellect,
Optimism of the will.
- Antonio Gramsci
Our own reality - however fine and attractive 
the reality of others may be - can only be 
transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by 
our own sacrifices, by our own efforts...
- President Amilcar Cabral
Africa is going through a particularly decisive 
moment in its struggle for economic 
emancipation... more so in South Africa... 
where the apartheid regime... is continuing its 
global strategy of destabilisation, promoting 
terrorism, oppression, occupation, sabotage and 
blackmail among the independent countries of 
the region.
- President Samora Moisés Machel
The Failures of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
To speak of development in respect to most Sub-Saharan African economies today 
is to speak of the past, not the present nor the immediate future. The 
world’s poorest region is becoming poorer (if less rapidly than over 1980—83) 
- in a number of economies real resource availability measured in physical 
gross domestic product adjusted for terms of trade changes is lower than in 
1970. In extreme cases - such as Mozambique, Zaire, Ghana and Uganda - it is 
probably lower than in the early 1960s. The present outlook in all too many 
cases is for "more of the same".
To describe SSA’s economic malaise in these macro (or mega) economic terms is 
necessary to holding any overview to manageable length. It is also grossly
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V misleading and insufficiently disquieting because it fails to convey the very
real human misery these figures inadequately symbolise. On the order of 100 
million human beings are seriously malnourished. Hundreds of thousands are 
dying prematurely annually from starvation and malnutrition caused reduction 
in resistance to disease. The human dimension of the crisis in SSA does not
lie primarily in graphs of current account deficits or inflation rates but in
rural clinics without drugs, schools without books, broken water systems
without spare parts, workers without employment or access to productive self 
employment. Development is about human beings. They are its end and its 
actors, it evaluators and its justification. By that test, even more than by 
that of economic aggregates, SSA is failing.
The prospects for the next decade on present trends and policies are but
little better than the record of the past six years. On relatively optimistic 
estimates as to the international economic and financial contexts, the World 
Bank projects maximum likely growth rates for SSA more or less equal to 
population growth for 1986-1995. Since the projections assume increased
shares of exports and of savings they really imply continued falls in real per 
capita consumption on top of '\5-20% (in several countries over 33%) falls 
since 1979 to levels near or below those of 1970. Unless something is done, 
rapidly, generally and backed by adequate resource allocations, there is 
nothing to deny the general message of the forecasts that on present trends 
most SSA economies are, at best, bound for a decade of stabilised stagnation.
The Economic and Human Cost of War
Another factor usually not treated in economic terms is dominant for Southern 
Africa defined as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference
region. Indeed its economic cost in 1985 and 1986 was at least as great as 
the continental cost of drought in its peak year of 1984.
That factor in South Africa's war of agression against its neighbours - 
especially but not only Angola and Mozambique. Estimates of its cost over 
1980-84 by SADCC and independent analysts are in the $10,000 to $13,000
million range. Updating suggests a 1980-86 total of $25,000 to $30,000, 
equivalent to the region's entire annual past loss achieved gross domestic
product. Mozambique's output appears to have been forced down to half what it
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TABLE 1
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS:
1960 - MID 1980'3 
Ghana 
I960 1970
1. Average Life Expectancy
Late Low Income Sub-
1970' 3 1980'a Saharan Africa
<1962)
at Birth *15 *19 55 53 *18
2. Infant Mortality Rate 132 107 86 107-120 118
3. Child Death Rate 27 21 15 25-30 2*1
*1. Access to Health 
Facility (b) . . _ 30 *15
5. Public Health Facility 
Visits Per Person 
Per Year 0.7 0.*» 2 (f)
6. Health Budget as
I of GDP . 1 .2 - 0.26 0.95
7. Access to Pure Water (c) 
Rural 1*4 1*1 *18 1*1
Urban - 86 86 75 62
Total - 35 35 60 22
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal (d)
Rural *10 *40 30 25
Urban - 92 95 65 69
Total - 55 56 *1*1 32
9. Average Calorie Avail­
ability as a % of 
requirements 92 97 88 68 91
10. Child Malnutrition 
(Moderate/Severe) - - 36 50-55 *10
11. Primary Education 
Enrolment Ratio (e) 38(*16) 6*4(75) 69(80) -(80) 69(-)
12. Adult Literacy 27 30 - 35-*45 *1*1
13. Education Budget as 
t of GDP - 3-9 - 0.85 2.81
1*1. Proportion of Population 
below Absolute Poverty 
Line (f)
Rural 60-65 67-1/2- 65
Urban 30-35
72-1/2
*15-50 35
Principal Sources: World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division,
Economic Analysis and Projections Department (June 198*1), 
World Development Report 1985; UNICEF, Statistics on 
Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 1985); UNICEF 
Ghana: Situation Analysis of Women and Children (July 
198*1).
Notes: a) 196O data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 between
1969 and 1971; late 1970's between 1975 and 1980; 1980's to 
1982, 198*4 or 1985.
b) Defined in terms of location within a 5 kilometre radius. May
overstate for urban population when facilities available are
small to serve the entire population nominally within reach of 
them.
c) 1970 and late 1970's urban figures may be overstated by failing 
to relate number of water points to population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly rural areas
overstate by failing to relate number of drop-holes to supposed 
user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted 
figures. Because of the primary/middle school division Ghana 
has a shorter primary cycle than most SSA countries.
f) Estimate made by author on basis of fragmentary data.
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k would have been without war.
The human costs are equally appalling. Recent analysis (carried out for 
UNICEF) suggests 8,500,000 peasants dislocated and over 4,500,000 persons in 
danger of starvation as a result of South African and proxy force aggression. 
Deaths from starvation as a result of war dislocation and blocking of relief 
supplies over 1983-85 probably total over 200,000. On reasonable estimates of 
mortality without and with the war, infant and child war deaths - from war 
related food shortages, dislocation and disruption of health services - in 
Angola and Mozambique are of the order of 120,000 a year or one every four 
minutes.
Strenuous efforts by SADCC member states to break the South African 
stranglehold on regional transport acquired over 1965-1975 have had only 
partial success beause of South African and proxy sabotage; sabotage carried 
out with the accompliceship of at least two Northern and two African states. 
The immediate prospects are for more, not less, economic and human losses 
unless and until effective defence support is made available to the Front Line 
States.
Another Perspective: Africa Has Survived
To take a totally negative view of 1980-85 events and responses would be 
unrealistic as well as needlessly pessimistic. Given the level of external 
shocks and the fragility of most SSA economic, social and political structures 
it is in one sense surprising that there are not more disaster stories like 
the Sudan and Uganda and that successes in achieving recovery, like Zimbabwe, 
and in creating foundations which give a reasonable chance for it, like Ghana, 
Tanzania and Nigeria are as common as they are.
Several factors stand out:
a. the resilience - in the absence of successive drought years - of the 
peasant economy and its ability (even with increasing land scarcity, few 
inputs and weak services) to continue to feed itself and to generate at 
least some marketable surpluses (up to three fouths of urban consumption 
on average);
b. the ability both in the peasant and informal sectors of households to 
find work (often casual self employment) leading to incomes on which to 
survive when sticking to 1980 income sources would have led to total 
paupery and/or death;
c. the range of adaptation and innovation - admittedly not all of it of very 
high productivity or value except under crisis conditions - by many 
individuals and some enterprises and institutions to substitute for what 
is no longer available. The range from improved fish smoking and small 
scale irrigation to substitution of cotton for artificial yarn in 
sweaters and sorghum for barley in bottled beer is impressive;
d. the preservataion of the core of basic services (and the base from which
to rebuild them) in several - not all - SSA states including some of the 
hardest hit;
e. the serious reflection on and reconstruction of instruments and medium 
term targets (admittedly not always successfully) by a substantial 
minority of SSA states;
f. the preservation - at least in most cases - of weakened but not shattered 
societies, functioning if faltering polities and economies in which 
starvation is the exception not the rule.
These are perhaps modest achievements. They amount basically to strategies
for short term survival. But survival is something. Disintegrated societies,
shattered polities, defunct economies and dead children, women and men have no 
present and no future in which to struggle to overcome the shocks and win back 
the losses of yesterday. Survival is the first condition for stabilisation, 
recovery and development. To date in most African countries it has been met 
for most people.
The view of SSA governments and their citizens as passive victims of disaster 
(or mis-management) equally passively holding out begging bowls while 
chattering shrilly and meaninglessly is integrally wrong. The most innovative 
ideas and actions - admittedly not always clearly thought out nor well 
coordinated - to reverse social and economic decline in Africa have been by
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Africans. Africans and African states have in fact been very ready - on 
occasion too ready - to take responsibility for disasters and to seek - on 
occasion far too quickly and without adequate thought - to correct real or 
supposed errors.
Whatever else can be said the majority of Africans and of African states have 
gone on trying. The near automaton figures of refugee camps (or the near 
zombie victims released from control by South African proxy forces) and broken 
backed and broken willed rulers like former President Liman of Ghana passively 
waiting for a coup to relieve them of the burden of office are the exception 
not the rule. Africans still believe they and their countries have a future 
and will still struggle to win it - the challenge is to find ways and means to 
validate that belief and to mobilise that struggle.
The Need To Act
The necessity and the urgency of action is proclaimed only too clearly by the 
1980-85 record and the 1986-95 projections - at least by and for Africans and 
by and for any person or institution concerned, for whatever reason from 
direct self interest through believing "No man is an island... Ask not for 
whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee".
It is necessary: to halt decline - in specific sectors, institutions and
services, in the economy as a whole and in the conditions of life of Africans 
(especially of the most vulnerable and severely affected groups); to 
rehabilitate productive and service capacity and to reactivate it to restore 
losses; and to restore a development dynamic of development - which in the SSA 
context must include growth of productive forces generally, and of earned 
import capacity in particular, as a necessary (even if not a sufficient) 
condition to improve human conditions especially for poor and vulnerable 
household members.
Clearly this cannot be done in more than a few cases by continuing along 
present or historic strategy and policy paths. Both the external and domestic 
environments have deteriorated too radically to permit holding on until things 
come right. That approach was viable over 1973-75 but even then required 
substantial short term restriction of demand and/or substantial increases in
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external bridging finance to a degree that amounted to at least a temporary 
strategy change. Further 1976-79 return to pre-1973 strategies has - as can 
be seen much more clearly in retrospect than at the time - left African 
economies even more vulnerable than before to external economic shocks and in 
particular to declines or sustained stagnation in real earned import capacity 
and net real external resource transfers. Intensification of these approaches 
- whether export led growth or standard import substitution - is likely in 
most cases to worsen the present situation and prospects rather than to 
improve them.
Action is needed as soon as possible - the costs of delay are already high and 
rapidly esculating. In human terms people are starving and more are being 
ground into abject poverty, children are being deprived both of education and 
of the food and medical services needed to take advantage of it, societies and 
polities are being strained and eroded to the verge of breakdown and 
disintegration (or beyond). In productive capacity terms lack of inputs and 
of maintenance is not merely causing current output losses but rapidly 
undermining the directly productive, infrastuctural, service provision, 
institutional, managerial and policy making bases on which recovery must be 
built. In political and national terms continued unsuccess makes mobilisation 
of effort ever harder. Confidence in ability to succeed is increasingly 
eroded by repeated failures, whatever their cause. Both nationally and 
internationally there often appears to be an unhappy combination or 
alternation of frenetic, ill thought out attempted action which proves 
unsustainable together with interminable debate and negotiation over secondary 
issues of scope or detail of degree or phasing which waste time and increase 
the difficulty of action far more than they can possibly improve its 
direction, definition or targeting.
Defining Objectives: African and External
Certain elements necessary for adequate action can be identified:
a. addressing the basic barriers to stabilisation, recovery and renewed 
development;
b. utilizing present potential to produce and present opportunities to 
restore or expand both production and human welfare;
c. allocating or reallocating enough resources for priority targets to be 
met;
d. achieving realism in perception of the limits on what can be achieved
rapidly, but also on the limits in degree and time to which per capita
stagnation or decline can be sustained without evolving into something 
much worse.
These criteria cannot be met within the present structures and dynamics of
more than a handful of African economies. The need for structural change - at
least economically - is no longer at issue even if its nature, diversity and 
phasing are.
Nor, in most cases, can they be met without either increased or at the least 
radically altered flows of net foreign resource transfers. That proposition 
has been challenged from two directions: first that global recovery would 
bring trade volume and terms improvements adequate to allow stabilisation and 
recovery and second that a rapid delinking from imports could form the basis 
of a practicable short term adjustment and recovery strategy. The first may 
be true for a few economies but for most it would require positing 50-100$ 
short term export volume increases and/or 25-50$ terms of trade recovery, 
neither of which is plausible. The second is simply implausible. The size, 
present structure, 1980-85 import compression and plausible structural change 
options of virtually all SSA economies mean that structural change (especially 
if directed toward national and regional economic integration) requires 
increased ability to import.
The bulk of this sketch toward new political economic policies and stategies 
is directed to what needs to be done - and ultimately can only be done - by 
Africans in SSA. It remains true, however, that rapid, adequate action does 
require more foreign exchange because import strangulation is a major cause of 
the present economic malaise and a major barrier to overcoming it. In the 
medium - and especially in the short - term that requires more net foreign 
resource transfers whether by expanded new grants, loans and investment, by
rescheduling or writing off old loans, by reducing or subsidizing interest 
rates or a combination of these measures. However, simply increasing 
transfers - let alone commitments - is not enough. They must be relevant to 
the actual urgent needs of SSA economies. That requires more rehabilitation 
and deferred maintenance and gap filling finance and less large new projects 
which can neither be fully operated nor properly maintained under existing 
import constraints and which in fact divert free foreign exchange from 
priority uses because the foreign finance does not cover their full direct 
plus indirect import requirements.
A Path Back to Development
The course of emergence from economic malaise can be divided conceptually into 
four stages:
a) stabilisation - i.e. halting absolute and limiting per capita decline to
create a foundation from which to rebuild;
b) rehabilitation of eroded capacity in production, infrastructure, basic
services, institutional competence and policy making/implementation;
c) recovery (basically built on rehabilitation plus "debottlenecking"
investment, e.g. to increase earned import capacity or to substitute for 
existing key imports) of output and consumption to aggregate levels 
approximating those of 1979 (and to per capita ones approximating 1979 
for food and basic services) and sustaining growth of aggregate
production and consumption at least equal to that of population (i.e. 3
to 4.5%);
d) renewed development including, but not limited to, patterns of production
growth consistent with sustaining internal and external balance as well 
as increasing average personal and communal consumption while avoiding 
immiserisation of vulnerable groups of people.
A handful of SSA economies - notably that of Botswana - can start with the 
fourth stage. If they are able to act promptly on stabilisation a few more - 
for example Zimbabwe and the Ivory Coast - can largely avoid the need for
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massive rehabilitation because capacity is still endangered rather than 
debilitated. For a majority all four stages are relevant. The first three 
overlap sequentially. The political and human costs of stabilisation are 
likely to prove unsustainable without some parallel recovery while 
rehabilitation usually requires some parallel investment in structural change 
("debottlenecking").
To proceed further in outlining what is - or may need - to be done it is 
necessary to review some of the key sectors, instruments and contentions 
issues. Such a review can be no more than a sketch or check list for three 
reasons. First is space. Second is the diversity of SSA. Third applied 
political economy is best articulated by those who must apply it, not 
externally whether by academicians or institutions. Both African governments 
and Africans and external institutions and academicians should reflect on the 
fact that over the 1970s agriculture was - in most countries - the sector 
receiving the greatest relative augmentation of attention and of resources and 
the sharpest policy and institutional changes and also the one in which 
foreign personnel, advice, models and, in large scale projects resources were 
most dominant at all levels from strategy through policy to project design 
implementation and - frequently - management. It was also - except for its 
household self provisioning (so-called subsistence) component which 
technocrats, governments and external experts tended (perhaps fortunately?) to 
ignore - the sector which performed least well.
Sectoral and Intrasectoral Priorities
Eight sectors of general priority are export or import saving production, 
food, manufacturing, physical infrastructure, human infrastructure, 
institutional capacity, policy processes and knowledge bases.
All SSA economies must give priority to raising earned import capacity, (i.e. 
export expansion) and to lowering demands on it, (i.e. expansion of import 
saving production). None has or in the near future will have a sustainable 
import to GDP ratio much below one quarter and none has an export sector with 
a safe medium to long term 6 to 8Í annual growth dynamic. Export promotion 
and import substitution need to be seen as two aspects of the same strategy of 
achieving external balance and sustainable development not as alternatives or
opposites. There can be, and has been, extremely cost/benefit inefficent 
export promotion just as there can be and has been equally inefficient import 
substitution. In respect to neither are simple general answers (except wrong 
ones) available and for both selective rather than sector wide policy 
intervention is likely to be critical in SSA as - in very different contexts 
it has been for Brazil and North Korea, Hungary and Taiwan, South Korea and 
Singapore.
Historic primary product and semi-processed exports are, perforce, crucial. 
For most two dilemmas need to be recognised. If most producers raise output 
rapidly the overall impact on price will be such as to cause each to earn less 
foreign exchange. And because world relative prices have been falling, with 
poor prospects for reversal in more than a handful of cases, to raise domestic 
real prices is to contradict both the basic principles of market economics and 
to plan to back losers. On the other hand to delink from them before 
replacements have been established is to link to even tighter dependence on 
grants, loans and external policy direction, as well as to import cuts to a 
degree inconsistent with stabilisation much less development.
In the short term most SSA economies must identify the least unpromising 
options to raise exports including: restoring debilitated traditional exports 
(e.g. cocoa in Ghana and copper in Zambia), holding market share in all but 
the most unpromising existing exports (e.g. Zimbabwe should seek to do so in 
steel and ferrochrome), capitalising on new natural resource based export 
potential (e.g. natural gas and products in Nigeria and Cameroon, pulp and 
paper in Tanzania), developing new agricultural exports with reasonable market 
prospects (e.g soy beans, maize in several countries). Over the slightly 
longer term analysis of potential for pre-export processing and manufacture 
(e.g. of hides and skins, cotton, sisal, logs and timber, ores and 
concentrates) of present exports and intra-regional trade in manufactures (as 
well as energy and food) should in most cases identify potential for export 
expansion and diversification. What is uniformly needed is more coherent and 
imaginative analysis backed by more sustained and prioretized export promotion 
funding (in whatever form is most appropriate).
However, export promotion will not be enough to regain external balance - nor 
to sustain it with to 6% GDP growth rates - for a majority of SSA 
economies. Equally systematic analysis of import substitution potential and
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priorities is needed in basic foodstuffs (including oilseeds, meat, fish, 
dairy products and perhaps sugar just as much as grain), in commercial fuel 
and energy, in broad market consumer goods and intermediate inputs into them, 
in construction materials, in engineering (usually starting with plant plus 
spares and components) and in tradeable services (e.g. construction). Forex 
earning and forex saving need to be analysed, programmed and promoted more 
coherently than has usually been the case in SSA and as mutually complementary 
(indeed for some products necessarily joint uses) rather than as mutually 
contradictory.
Food availability per capita in most SSA economies for most Africans was below 
nutritionally desirable levels in 1970 and has declined since. Even 
abstracting from droughts and allowing for the abysmal quality of most basic 
data (and the resulting error margins of all analysis based on it) there is a 
growing problem of not growing enough food.
To what extent this is a price problem is unclear because the prices growers 
receive for most of their food sales are not well known. Consumer food prices 
have risen more rapidly than other prices in most African countries for over 
two decades and official grower prices for food have in almost all cases 
outpaced wages - and in many cost of living - since the late 1970s. This is 
not to say that too low official prices may not deter output of specific crops 
- especially export crops - nor to deny the need for more rational and 
coherent setting of prices with greater regard to grower net incomes, changes 
in wages and other prices and 'free' market price indicators. These points 
are now conventional wisdom - and partly (sometimes over-energetically) acted 
on in most of SSA. The ease and generality with which they can be argued, the 
simplicity of price alteration (or abandoning set prices) and the ease of 
monitoring price change conditions now create a danger that other necessary 
conditions for price (or any other) policy changes to affect food output will 
not receive priority attention. It needs to be recalled that on average 75 to 
80Í of food production is household self provisioning, over 15% privately 
marketed and under 5% public sector marketed so that in general sole attention 
to official prices and public sector marketing is very much expecting the tail 
to wag the dog. Other key factors include:
a. buyers (public or private) who are at (or come to) accessible points at 
known times and pay in cash promptly are frequently absent;
b. transport (both public and private) to allow timely procurement and 
movement of crops and movement/supply of input and "incentive" goods is 
frequently weak or absent sectors because of infrastructure and vehicle 
park deterioration;
c. inadequate and overcentralized storage facilities frequently lead to 
peaking of seasonal transport demand, maximisation of transport costs, 
high storage losses and inability to hold intra-year reserves;
d. basic services (health, education, accessible pure water, fuel) are 
frequently debilitated or never existed with negative production effects 
(time on wooding and watering, illness, tiredness, lack of knowledge) 
plus disincentive effects to staying in rural areas;
e. absence, shortages and untimely arrival of agricultural production inputs
(including even hoes) and of "incentive" goods (basic consumer
manufactures and construction materials) have become endemic even in
middle income countries. Lack of inputs lowers production potential. 
Without desired goods to buy no price is "real" to the peasant producer;
f. research is usually neither locally field tested, user net income
viability tested nor peasant compatability tested so that, even if
extended (which it often is not), it is likely to have a low acceptance
rate and a lower positive output result. For many food crops in many
areas relevant research does not exist.
To devise food production strategies to identify and to overcome these defects 
is probably more critical than, and certainly complementary to, "getting 
prices right". Prices can certainly cause shifts between or among crops.
Unless paralleled by measures to allow enhanced prooductivity, they have much 
less impact on overall output; most real price elasticities of overall
agricultural output appear to have been 0.3 to 0.5 historically and with 
decreased availability of inputs likely to be lower now. The gravest problem 
confronting SSA agriculture - and most peasant households within it - is how 
to raise productivity per producer by means that are both practicable for, and 
economically rewarding to, producers.
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A significant proportion of the African food shortage rests on peasant 
households who are basically food producers but cannot grow enough to 
provision themselves adequately. For them higher food prices are irrelevant 
(or harmful) and cash input intensive packages for increasing food grown to be 
eaten by its growers usually financially inaccessible. Far more focussed and 
higher priority attention on how to respond to needs and problems of this 
group of hungry people who are also food producers is urgently needed. It 
must, to be effective, take into account that many of these households are 
female headed and that, more generally, food production for household 
provisioning in SSA almost always falls on the female side of the gender 
division of labour. Agricultural research has rarely taken this gender 
division both of production and of labour into account with results which are 
damaging to the relative - and often absolute - workload of women and the 
level of household provisioning output. Similarly for extension services 
women and women-headed households (and the latter’s special problems including 
access to labour or draught power to plough on time) have traditionally been 
invisible.
Since women's work overload includes a high proportion of watering, wooding 
and food processing (all part of household provisioning) technical change in 
these fields is directly relevant to women's ability to produce food - as well 
as to have time to draw breath. Unfortunately failure to view peasant 
households as complex socio-economic systems (and ones quite able to describe 
themselves, their needs and what assistance they - especially she - want in 
meeting them) as opposed to fragmented food, industrial or export crop
production lines has made research and extension less production or food 
security efficient as well as less humane and far less serviceable to women 
and to vunerable groups.
Manufacturing in Africa cannot solve certain problems (e.g. employment) and is 
often inefficient by most tests. Unfortunately this has tended to cause a 
lack of attention both to its strengths and to its critical role in 
stabilisation through renewed development, especially in respect to
agriculture and government revenue. In a significant number of SSA economies
adequate quantities of many basic agricultural inputs and most incentive goods 
cannot be manufactured because forex for spares, direct inputs and fuel is 
restricted so that output is - say - 25Í to 40Í of capacity and is snapped up 
in urban areas because of lower time, transport cost and risk factors even
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though rural prices are higher.
Similarly much of the recurrent budget deficit in several states results from 
loss of sales, import and company tax receipts caused by falls in domestic 
manufactured goods output. It is very difficult to see how stabilisation of 
the government budget can be achieved before rehabilitation and recovery in 
manufacturing. Further cuts in real spending on maintenance and on basic 
services would be counterproductive. Savings from cutting wasted expenditure 
and reorganising programmes to achieve targeted outputs at lower cost are 
possible but even on the most optimistic reasonable estimates their short term 
yields are below required increases in maintenance expenditure. Military and 
pure administration spending is in principle subject to reduction - how far 
this is true in practice is another matter. Tax or fee alternatives to 
restored import/sales tax revenue tend to have clear disadvantages. Higher or 
restored export and - in at least many cases - higher income and company taxes 
would have serious negative production incentive effects. Poll (head) taxes 
and high user charges for basic services are regressive, weigh particularly 
heavily on vulnerable groups and are often very cost inefficient in personnel 
and funds used relative to revenue collected.
In the medium term manufacturing - is critical to the external balance 
position and to development of regional integration. The issues of cost are 
real but often are overgeneralised from the worst projects. While protection 
and state intervention over several decades are certainly not sufficient 
conditions for building a viable home based industrial sector and breaking 
through into exports, the cases of Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan - as well as 
tentatively Zimbabwe in SSA - suggest they are necessary ones.
Physical infrastructure - transport (including rolling stock and vehicle 
parks), enterprise water supplies, communications, energy and storage - are 
among the most debilitated sectors. Bottlenecks and overloads can be 
identified. These raise the cost of production and slow its pace. 
Rehabilitation, gap filling and debottlenecking and forward planning to avoid 
repetition of maintenance/overload/bottleneck problems are crucial. The key 
missing element is forex - partly because external funds are more available 
for new projects than for rehabilitation or maintenance; partly from domestic 
preference for new projects.
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Human infrastructure sub-sectors - education, drinking water, health, domestic 
fuel, housing - are in many cases equally or more debilitated, especially in 
rural areas. Their importance in making possible present production - through 
reducing time demands of wooding and watering, saving human energy, increasing 
health and providing knowledge - are frequently seriously underestimated as is 
the disincentive impact of their absence or deterioration (in particular on 
rural-urban migration. Their relevance to future productive capacity and for 
the quality of life are more widely perceived although their special relevance 
to vulnerable groups (including women and children and particularly those of 
poor households) is usually underestimated.
In these sectors three priority needs can be identified; restoring effective 
coverage and quality (e.g. provision of paper, books, drugs, fuel, pump 
spares, staff retraining) of what has been created; redesigning systems away 
from overconcentration on limited access, high quality - usually urban and 
upper income group oriented - sub-sectors toward more basic universal access 
coverage; filling gaps - particularly in specialised, middle level personpower 
(e.g. artisans, technicians, bookkeepers) training - seriously hindering 
production and management and, as soon as resources permit, restoring advances 
toward universal access to basic services.
Institutional capacity can be defined as the presence (or absence) of 
knowledge, expertise, historic memory (e.g. useable and used filing and 
archive systems), communications systems, accounting, coordination, monitoring 
and accountability within institutions, institutional sub-systems and overall. 
This "sector" appears to have deteriorated radically in many SSA states over 
the past few years (partially because workers at all levels have indeed 
responded to - negative - real wage and salary incentives). Unless it is 
rehabilitated, management and policy capacity improvement will be virtually 
impossible to achieve.
Technical assistance (even by international management consultants) can be 
useful within a national commitment and programme but cannot substitute for 
them. Further, much of what is usually called institutional reform 
constitutes evading facing the weaknesses identified by drawing new 
organisational structures which in reality repeat the old gaps and failings,
e.g. Tanzania’s co-op to crop authority to co-op transition to nowhere.
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Data and research bases is another sector which has historically been weak and 
which has - despite increased personnel and financial resource allocations - 
deteriorated in a majority of SSA economies. Three general targets can be 
noted: greater prioritisation in terms of critical user needs (e.g.
agricultural yield statistics and field - producer viability - peasant 
useability tested crop research) and better two way communication with users; 
attention to having reasonably accurate data available in time to inform 
decisions; more national and regional cooperation ranging from exchange of 
information up to joint training and research programmes.
Instruments for Action
Nine instruments for implementing policies, projects and strategies nine stand 
out as deserving priority attention in most - or all - SSA countries: 
distribution, participation, incentives, micro management, macro-management, 
public sector effectiveness, private sector, regional
coordination/co-operation and external resources. Four further critical 
instruments - prices, overall economic management, employment and 
savings/investment increases are reviewed in the next section because they are 
areas of substantial disagreement (as well as of agreement). Distribution and 
participation are - or can reasonably be - seen and analysed as ends but are 
here considered as instruments.
Distribution and production are largely co-determined, i.e. who is able to 
take part in what way in production largely determines distribution. 
Redistribution after that is secondary. Therefore production support and 
incentives will largely determine income distribution.
Redistribution can be seen as primary: altering ability to produce and rewards 
for producing; secondary: provison of basic services (which raise present and 
future ability to produce); and tertiary: direct transfer payments plus
taxation. Any production policy or project - if successful - effects primary 
redistribution (whether it is provision of infrastructure, higher wages and/or 
grower prices, selection of a labour intensive project or one in a particular 
area). This impact on a case by case and overall basis needs attention to 
ensure that the redistribution effects of production oriented decisions are 
overall (not necessarily for each project or policy) consistent with rather
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than inimical to national distribution targets. That is crucial in SSA 
because resources for significant transfer payments will not be available in 
the forseeable future.
Participation is more widely lauded verbally than pursued fully or 
systematically in practice. Its first aspect of participation in production 
and second of participation in carrying out policies (e.g. community 
afforestation, self help inputs into infrastructure) are genuinely sought, 
albeit rarely with enough attention to what peasants and workers say would 
motivate them to participate or what they know about how and what to do. 
Participation in taking decisions and designing policies/projects is practiced 
unevenly, a failing frequently entailing high costs in technical design 
mistakes and wrong selection leading to poor participation in implementation 
and/or performance. Participation in the sense of ability to hold officals 
and institutions - especially external agency personnel and projects 
accountable is rarely even endorsed verbally and is usually resisted in 
pratice at least as energetically in SSA (and by external agencies and 
personnel there) as elsewhere.
Incentives include prices (producer prices including wages and their 
relationship to input and consumption good prices). However, there are also 
other incentives. In the context of low and/or falling per capita output 
these require priority examination and strengthening precisely because of 
limits on the real price and real wage fronts. These include availability and 
quality of basic services and basic consumer goods (including construction 
materials). Community and national as well as ideological commitments and as 
a sense of meaningful participation and a belief that development (as defined 
by the person) is attainable so that effort is not a pure waste are also 
critical motivating factors with which economists and economic decision takers 
find it hard to relate.
Micro-managerial capacity at institutional level (in both the public and 
private sectors) level is an acknowledged pervasive weakness in SSA. Because 
the worsening national contexts have greatly increased demands on management 
it is hard to say whether in general - as opposed to identifiable specific 
cases - it is deteriorating absolutely. That it is increasingly often unable 
to combine day to day crisis management with normal ongoing activity 
supervision, annual operational planning and medium term forward planning is
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only too clear. Corrective measures are priorities. Some have already been 
mentioned, e.g. under institutional and human infrastructure. However, 
certain other contextual problems exist especially, but not only, with respect 
to government and public enterprise management. These include inadequate 
powers, enterprise targets and standards of performance and incentives, i.e. 
to the overall structure and context within which micro management takes 
place. Hardly unique to SSA, these problems are frequently more extreme and 
more costly.
Macro management includes sectoral and overall decision taking/policy making. 
Here the SSA record is very varied but skewed toward the bottom end of the 
scale. The most general problems relate to weaknesses in production, 
collection, analysis and use of data to inform decisions, to design and 
implement policies and programmes, to monitor results, and to achieve 
meaningful flexibility responding promptly to correctible deviations from 
intended performance. Unfortunately these weaknesses are rarely seen as a 
cluster of related and endemic problems and still more rarely given priority 
attention. Failure of coordination and of testing for consistency 
(particularly by central economic units) is more frequently cited as a 
weakness but serious action (except by ad hoc expansion of Treasury powers 
which may or may not be effective) results rather less frequently.
Public sector effectiveness requires subdivision between government and public 
enterprise. In the first case there is frequently a need to prioretise to see 
that the most important functions (including these for which there are no 
realistic private sector or community alternatives) are carried out adequately 
even if this means totally dropping some desirable but less critical services. 
A frequent problem following real budget cuts and forex constraints is an 
imbalance toward personnel who for budgetary or foreign exchange scarcity 
reasons do not have the resources to carry out their duties. Either less 
personnel or larger budgetary and forex allocations for complementary inputs 
are essential to restoring operational balance in such cases.
Recurrent budget deficits are now endemic in SSA - even in countries which 
achieved regular surpluses to the late 1970s - and do contribute substantially 
to inflationary pressures. Since real expenditure levels - excluding interest 
and production incentive subsidies (which may of course be inefficient and 
targets for cuts) have fallen significantly while certain key areas -
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maintenance and repair generally but also basic health and medical services - 
urgently need restored real levels, the bulk of the balancing should come from 
increased revenue. Contrary to popular impression SSA government recurrent 
budgets are not particularly large relative to GDP - indeed some are very low,
e.g. Ghana - nor is the number of government employees as a proportion of 
economically active population. A case for reprioritisation (including 
reducing waste) certainly exists; one for general reductions is much less 
apparent.
Public enterprises often suffer from overextension and would benefit from 
prioretisation on a basis analogous to government. They also suffer from the 
micro-managerial weaknesses noted above - as do governments. However, their 
efficiency of performance - on almost any criteria - varies widely (wildly 
indeed) among and within countries; almost no generalisations are valid in 
that respect. Similarly the reasons for their creation or acquisition, the 
roles they play and the presence or absence of real private sector 
alternatives are anything but uniform. Given the wide range of results there 
is a general case for review and for seeking to bring up the standards of the 
weakest priority public enterprises toward those of the strongest as well as 
phasing out low priority, unprofitable ones.
Private sector utilisation deserves more attention in most SSA economies, 
albeit since all are in fact mixed economies and fairly certain to remain so 
this is far more a matter of degree and less one of ideology than is often 
supposed.
A practical problem is that neither advocates nor critics of public enterprise 
in Africa really have examined the capacity, viability and efficiency of the 
private sectors and sub-sectors (large-medium-small, domestic-foreign) in SSA. 
These vary widely and the advocates of unleashing the private sector seem at 
the general level to overestimate them absolutely as well as relative to the 
public sector enterprises which sometimes are as or more efficient in specific 
(not all) cases.
Two issues need exploration. First whether at large enterprise level it is 
generally possible. Domestic private capacity is limited. The current 
economic situation and prospects of SSA are not such as to attract foreign 
investors except for very special projects or in a handful of countries.
Second, economic macro management and micro intervention to balance private 
sector incentives and broader national economic interest is - in general - not 
a strong point of African states; overregulation and unintended disincentives 
and underregulation (by market or other means) and unintended (at least by the 
state) bonanza donation are all too frequent - often in the same state.
Regional economic coordination is - for most SSA states - a means to 
broadening the range of viable production and exports, reducing establishment 
and operational costs for some institutions - programmes - infrastructure and 
for coordinating development and use of transport and communications 
facilities. To achieve these ends it needs to be based on perceived mutual 
interests which usually turn on production and transport with trade as a 
consequential validating means not an end in itself. This suggests need for 
rethinking approaches to coordination/cooperation. The orthodox trade 
preference centred model has a rather resounding history of failure or very 
limited success.
Substitution of regional imports for those now imported from extra-regional 
sources (quite possible for a substantial number of products) is crucial. 
Imports from within the cooperation area are often as important as exports to 
it. Various forms of countertrade (including services as well as goods) will 
need to be developed on a larger scale if rapid coordination area trade growth 
is to be sustained since rapid unbalanced trade expansion with growing hard 
currency settlements by debtors is not feasible.
External Resources: Quantity, Quality, Relevance
External resources are important to achieving stabilisation, rehabilitation 
and recovery. First, more resources are needed. Second, these should be far
less tied to projects and far more generally useable to support rehabilitation
and the operation of key existing capacity (e.g. health, industry). Third,
for most purposes in most SSA states - with a handful of possible middle
income group exceptions - grant or near grant money is needed. 8Í loans drawn 
over 3 years and repaid over the next 5 are, in general, totally unsuitable as 
to cost and duration (even if from the IMF). Fourth, SSA, as admitted in the 
World Bank's 1986 SSA study cannot possibly repay existing debt as scheduled. 
Concerted attention to long term debt reconstruction and consolidation as well
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as accompanying new money and plus radical SSA improvement of debt recording 
and management are priorities.
External finance is critical to African action being effective. It - unlike 
African action - requires external iniatives and programme articulation. The 
1986 OAU subbmission to the UN Special Session is a good guide to which 
initiatives Africa should continue to press and to how to monitor results.
At the same time it must be recognised that not all external resource 
transfers to SSA have been beneficial and that the proportion which are not or 
will not be has been increased by growing foreign exchange shortages and 
economic stagnation or decline. In this respect three negative imperatives 
for African states to enforce in accepting or rejecting ’aid’ stand out:
a. cease accepting projects of doubtful (or patently negative) economic 
value to even if pushed because beneficial to lender exports;
b. do not design or approve projects with untested, speculative or clearly 
inadequate direct and indirect productive potential - a criticism 
relevant to a large number of 1970’s integrated rural development 
projects;
c. do not stick rigidly to the dominance of new project finance even when 
the situation and prospects indicate that there is little chance of 
adequate maintenance or reasonable capacity utilisation ratios.
To be useful external resources need to be useable in support of agreed 
strategies. In the present context of all but a few SSA states this implies:
a. additional "balance of payments support” finance dircted toward increased 
levels of capacity utilisation in critical sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
industry, health, education) including current production inputs;
b. a parallel increase in priority to rehabilitation programmes;
c. selective support for new capacity prioretised in terms of breaking 
existing or avoiding medium term bottlenecks;
- 2 2 -
d. finance in support of export (including regional and sub-regional export) 
expansion including revolving funds to enable enterprises to purchase 
imported inputs and to extend export credit;
e. financial cooperation with SSA economic coordination initiatives and 
their priority programmes including general eligibility of coordination 
group members (and other SSA economies) to bid for contracts financed by 
grant or concessional loan funds;
f. funding of programmes designed to limit losses from economic malaise and 
from production oriented adjustment strategies to vulnerable groups (e.g. 
the UNICEF/Danida rural basic drug project in Tanzania);
g. priority to coordinated international - regional - national applied 
research programmes (e.g. in agriculture, forestry and health);
h. meeting the full direct and indirect foreign exchange cost of projects 
and programmes including funding a substantial portion of unanticipated 
cost overruns to avoid unsustainable forex drains and delays and 
cancellation or prolonged renegotiation of projects.
i. in countries with excessive domestic financing requirements resulting 
from objectively insufficient revenue bases despite fiscal effort and 
prudence in spending securing a portion of local cost finance in the 
external grant and soft loan support, perhaps by the more innovative use 
of food aid in substitution for commercial imports.
Controversies And/Or Confusions
Certain areas appear to generate substantial controversy - part real, part 
arising out of diverse concrete case and part out of confusion of terms. 
Among them are efficiency, prices, protecting vulnerable groups, population 
growth, raising savings and investment rates, employment and supply and/or 
versus demand management.
Efficiency requires specific qualification as to efficiency for what purposes 
and to whose benefit. It is not logically possible to say whether an
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allocation, policy or enterprise is efficient until its goals and intended 
beneficiaries are specified. Import non-intensity, export intensity, total 
scarce resource cost, profitability, contribution to real GDP, access to basic 
services, household food security, per cent of households above the absolute 
poverty line, are all valid criteria of efficiency in a number of contexts but
do not necessarily give the same answers or rankings. Further present and
future efficiency often diverge so that time discount - and avoiding dead end 
- issues arise. So too do preferences - Uganda's macro-magendo (monopolistic 
parallel economy) system in its heyday arguably had more potential for
achieving accumulation, structural change and economic reconstruction than its 
successors, but was so humanly appalling that not even fervent free market 
advocates chose to back it. Most cases are not that extreme, but political
economic preferences are real and overriding them also has costs.
Prices (including exchange rates) are not an area of total disagreement. They
are critical in respect to incentives and to overall and micro-economic
management. As such they need to be made/allowed to be consistent and to be 
managed to facilitate regaining viable external and domestic balance 
positions. That area of agreement suggests the need for substantial price - 
including exchange rate - changes in many SSA economies. The real issues seem 
to be:
a. how much price management is needed and for what purposes - i.e. how
imperfect are SSA markets under present conditions of extreme scarcity?
b. how appropriate is the price mechanism for basic services (e.g. health)
and for other goods whose broad use has external economies to
individuals, enterprises, communities and/or countries?
c. how far can price management go? In what cases should other economically 
based allocation devices, e.g. bank credit? foreign exchange? certain 
basic consumer goods? be used;
d. how generally can tax/subsidy price incentive packages be used?
e. how fast can major adjustments be made without fracturing already weak
structures including setting off inflationary forces which rapidly cancel 
attempted 'shock treatment' changes?
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» f. when do the benefits of price manipulation, e.g. efficient production 
cost plus based price controls, uniform farmgate prices, pre-set seasonal 
or multiyear crop prices outweigh costs?
These are all legitimate questions which are in danger of being obscured or 
answered at a sweepingly general level when in fact the answers vary 
significantly from country to country, price to price and time to time.
Workable answers can only be formulated in specific contexts by those who will 
have to work them and live with the consequences. Further they will need 
regular review and - like prices themselves - to be changed from time to time.
A related set of arguments turning on prices are really about income 
distribution often with little effort to estimate actual impact. For example 
in Tanzania 1984 IMF proposals to close the recurrent budget deficit, increase 
overall enterprise profits and raise real grower prices 25-50Í at one go would 
have required lowering real wages, salaries and informal sector incomes at 
least 50Í (following a 50Í average 1979-83 fall). That is politically 
impracticable and, given that the minimum wage’s purchasing power was already 
25Í below the average peasant household cash and self provisioning (food,
housing) real income while wage earner average productivity was substantially
higher, would seem to pose economic efficiency and equity problems as well as
presupposing that wage earners do not respond to economic incentives and 
disincentives (e.g. by moonlighting, theft, corruption).
Within a context of stagnant or falling national purchasing power (physical 
GDP adjusted for terms of trade changes) there are in the short run few or no 
degrees of freedom for raising any broad group of real incomes significantly - 
by relative price changes or any other route - unless an almost immediate net 
gain in production equivalent to the real income increase can be anticipated 
with reasonable certainty, or unless soft external finance to cover the costs 
to other groups is available.
Protecting vulnerable groups is partly a matter of economic prudence because 
in SSA children and women are among the most vulnerable and the medium term 
economic cost of not protecting them is high. However, for other vulnerable 
groups - especially farmers and pastoralists pushed into sub-marginal, high 
risk areas and much of the urban informal sector - the political economic case
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is more humane, social and/or political rather than production economics 
based.
One protection - and one which has been fully maintained in few if any SSA 
economies - is continued access to basic services and a second - which has 
been eroding - is drought or famine relief (including food-for-work or work 
for food rural construction schemes as in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho). 
The basic answer is making it possible for members of these groups to raise 
productivity and reduce risk. This requires research on what is practicable 
in any actual context and a recognition that in cost/production benefit terms 
the payoff may be low and that the additional output (or its proceeds if sold) 
will be virtually 100Í consumed by the producing households. In urban cases 
removal of petty regulations - e.g. licensing, banning various types of 
vendors and other service sellers - and fees - e.g. on standpipe water and on 
petty trading - can be valuable out of all proportion to any revenue or other 
loss.
There is a growing awareness that production oriented strategies and heavy 
reliance on market pricing do threaten vulnerable groups. The debate is on 
which groups are seriously at risk, how they can be shielded and what 
approaches are cost efficient, i.e. reduce human vulnerability at financeable 
prices.
Protecting vulnerable groups and poor people and protecting vulnerable, 
rehabilitating degraded environments are closely linked. Poor people are 
particularly likely to live in environmentally fragile areas. Need, not 
greed, is the single most important cause of environmental damage (including 
urban pollution) in SSA.
Population pressure has pushed more and more households onto fragile, drought 
prone, steeply sloping or otherwise marginal or extramarginal land. In Kenya 
it is estimated 500,000 people are in this group living on land with which 
present technology cannot safely be farmed and should be left to extensive 
grazing.
Similarly as crops take over what were drought or dry season reserve pastures, 
pastoralists are forced deeper and deeper into the sahel and desert margin 
zones. When a drought comes their losses of cattle - and the crop losses of
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the sub-marginal land farmers - are likely to be catastrophic.
Fuelling needs also interact with population and drought. Most African 
peasants respect trees and bushes. They know they provide food, fodder for 
livestock, building materials and fuel as well as holding the soil in place 
and that to cut live trees or bushes (as opposed to gathering and cutting dead 
limbs or trees and fruits and nuts, for most uses and some branches for 
fodder) is to imperil the future. But if the alternative is no cooked food or 
shelter or food to keep livestock alive then - espcially in drought years - 
grim need forces them to erode their own future, erosion, wind and rain are 
quick to continue.
The long term results - and their near ubiquitousness -are seen from Table 2. 
They are even more clearly seen on landsat photos. On these, erosion ravaged 
areas, show as a dead-bone-white. The overcrowded 'reserves' of South Africa, 
the former 'reserves' in Zimbabwe, the drought, locust and population worn 
down Sahel margin, the long (but now at an accelerating pace) deforested and 
eroding highlands of Ethiopia all show up as white spots of creeping land 
leprosy.
Rapid population growth requires resources before it raises output and in the 
context of limited fertile land with dependable rainfall and low increases in 
output per hectare exacerbates the food security crisis. Quick successions of 
pregnancies are damaging to child and mother health and to family ability to 
feed, clothe, educate the children. That is agreed. Crude pro-natalism is in 
retreat.
What instruments are effective in reducing birth rates is less agreed with a 
tendency for proponents of one instrument to ignore others. Education - for 
mothers and for children - is associated with smaller (and better spaced) 
families as is lower infant mortality. Historically falls in birth rates have 
been associated with increases in old age security (not necessarily by state 
schemes) and increases in real incomes of poor households. These conditions 
will prove hard to meet in SSA. In their absence more demographic research 
and state pronouncements (except perhaps on child spacing) will have 
relatively little impact and access to family planning knowledge and hardware 
by themselves usually a quite limited one. To view lower population growth as
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an alternative to higher growth of food production is grossly unrealistic.
Raising domestic savings ratios in SSA today may not be a generally plausible 
or desirable objective until exports rise substantially relative to GDP or 
external resource flows increase significantly. In the context of severe 
foreign exchange constraints in which earned import capacity can at most cover 
critical operating imports plus external interest payments, domestic savings 
ex post cannot by definition exceed the true local content of GFCF allowing 
for indirect as well as direct imports, i.e. 35 to 50Í of it. An attempt to 
raise them ex ante is likely to fail and to reduce use of productive capacity. 
If it succeeds, a shift from consumption to saving will, because of the above 
average import content of GFCF, only be possible with a consumption cut two or 
three times as large. Capacity growth will be enhanced but at the price of 
falling capacity utilisation and lower present output.
Under conditions of falling real per capita income and substantial excess 
capacity, stabilisation and recovery are likely to be pursued more effectively 
by seeking first to restore output growth to a level at least equal to that of 
population and only then seeking to rebuild overall capacity growth to similar 
level. If 1984 overall capacity underutilisation was 15-20Í (as for Zimbabwe) 
then 4 to 5Í growth of output and 3Í growth of capacity would still leave 
capacity utilisation at or under 90Í in 1990. Over that initial period GFCF 
should be concentrated on bottleneck breaking and laying foundations for 
regaining external balance not on attempting to force up general capacity 
growth rates.
These constraints do not bind so tightly once significant export growth is 
achieved or if additional foreign resource flows allow substantial 
rehabilitation and recovery. Nor do they mean that recurrent government and 
public enterprise budget balance should not be sought, but that the reasons 
for so doing in much of SSA at present relate to micro and macro management 
rather more than to increasing total savings.
Employment - in the sense of productive wage or self employment - is central 
to SSA economy extrication from economic malaise at the macro and even more at 
the household level. Since SSA has relatively plentiful unskilled labour, its 
more productive use is logically central to any production enhancing/scarce 
resource economising strategy. Equally production which excludes much of the
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labour force will exclude many households from distribution. Both points lie 
behind the switch of emphasis from large farms towards peasant producers. 
Large farms are, for most crops and under most conditions in SSA, both cost 
and foreign exchange inefficient when compared to many peasant producers and 
also do not touch the problems of low income rural households except to render 
them still less soluble by diverting both resources and markets. They apply 
more generally if serious attention is paid to how labour intensity can be 
augmented and unskilled (or newly semi-skilled) labour productivity enhanced.
Employment - including self employment - as a means to meeting the needs of 
poor people and increasing the security, vulnerable groups cannot be studied 
or programmed as an undifferentiated whole. The intra-household issues 
addressed under agriculture apply more generally. 'Women’s work' including 
sources of cash income is in practice significantly different from 'men's 
work' in SSA but also the gender division of labour varies sharply from region 
to region and even country to country.
Similarly poor household access to more remunerative (usually because more 
productive) employment or self employment will on average necessarily be for 
different types of employment than for other persons and households because 
poverty is correlated with literacy, skill and location - as well as cash - 
disadvantages. Therefore, employment/self employment creation or upgrading 
needs to be based on examination of who, where, with what skills needs work
and what, where, requiring what inputs is to be done. Only then is there much
chance of achieving (including by upgrading worker skills and restructuring 
'job' requirements) a reasonable fit between would-be workers and priority 
work to be done.
In a different sense employment in the public (and large scale private) sector 
is a problem because reduced output (usually for forex but sometimes for 
market constraint reasons) has reduced productivity and created an imbalance 
in outlay while falling real wages have eroded incentives and thus yet further 
lowered productivity. Unless output - whether in health, education or a 
directly productive enterprise - can be restored, a real case exists for 
reducing the numbers employed and using a substantial part of the savings to
increase the real wages of those still employed. The problem with this
approach - apart from the serious one of opposition by a well organised group 
of losers - is that it may create a new vulnerable group requiring support to
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reestablish itself.
Demand vs supply management disagreement tends to set discussants at cross 
purposes because of the varying meaning of the terms. Demand management - 
tends to concentrate on macro monetary aggregates, adjusting resource use to 
correspond to supply. Macro aggregates are important, but far from 
everything. Achieving balance is a priority for attaining stabilisation, but 
since the present crises are dominantly supply collapse initiated and manifest 
themselves in capacity under-utilisation and specific resource imbalances not 
generalised•overheating a strong case exists against unselective macro demand 
cutting.
Supply management has two very different strands - macro ideological (as in 
Laffer Curves) and micro contextual (as in World Bank structural adjustment 
programming). The relevance of the former to SSA - or anywhere else - is 
limited. The latter is crucial. Restoring supply and altering its structure 
to remove specific imbalances (e.g. in food, energy and farex) is the basis of 
restoring balance to provide a basis for recovery and sustained growth through 
pushing available resources (supply) back up to previous levels of resource 
use (demand). Whether SAP's as now designed are optimal is an important but 
secondary issue - they are serious attempts to achieve adjustment by 
increasing production not cutting demand. They are increasingly incompatible 
with IMF style stabilisation based on a short term, macro monetary model which 
virtually requires that demand cuts, not capacity utilisation and 
rehabilitation, receive pride of place. There is an urgent need to reconcile 
initial stabilisation with parallel rehabilitation and subsequent recovery. 
Stabilisation without adjustment which can lead to recovery, let alone 
stabilisation which prevents such adjustment, is hardly worth having.
Notes Toward the Beginnings of Revival
SSA's economic malaise can be overcome. There is a growing body of 
identification of causes and of areas in which action is needed plus - less 
clearly - what action is both desirable and practicable not merely at 
sub-continental but, more important, at national, sectoral and local levels. 
With a lag this knowledge is coming to inform the attitudes and priorities of 
a growing number of African decision takers, states and institutions and -
%
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more slowly - of external agencies and decision takers relating to SSA.
However, several elements needed are only now beginning to be understood
beyond very narrow technical and technico political circles either in SSA or
abroad:
a. A realisation of how serious the problems and prospects are, e.g. how
much capacity has been eroded, how fast debt service is likely to cut net
capital inflows, how little benefit SSA will - without significant
structural change - gain from trickle out of plausibly projected OECD 
recovery; and in parallel
b. realisation of how urgent it is to articulate and execute coherent
strategy and policy changes both because failure tends to become
self-perpetuating and because the time lag from execution to positive 
results is 12 to 24 months and to full recovery 5 to 10 years; with a 
partly consequential
c. failure of Africans to inform and educate Africans as to realities and
options in order to mobilise support for renewed (and painful) effort
based both on an appreciation of how dire realities and how restricted
options are and on a belief that something can be achieved;
d. adequate levels of external resource flows which are in fact usable to 
support strategies and agendas of the type discussed;
e. enough African involvement in analysis and dialogue and especially in 
strategy - policy - praxis design and articulation, enough recognition 
among external actors that without such involvement the success of any 
strategy or agenda is improbable or of having and displaying enough 
respect for and interaction with African initiatives - even if they, like 
the external ones, are to date imperfect and incomplete;
f. a parallel African politico-technocratic acceptance that workers, 
peasants, lower level officials and small businessmen must be involved in 
providing expertise and information, in choosing and deciding as well as 
implementing if the hard struggle for recovery is to be won - or, indeed, 
fought on the right fronts - and that offering blood sweat and tears with
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no end to the poor and vulnerable but villas, vacations and variegated 
goods to elites is a recipe for economic failure as well as social 
disruption and political disaster.
The last points may require elaborating. Evaluations of aid efficiency at 
project level show that lack of substantive technical and decision taker 
African involvement in design and execution regularly leads to avoidable 
contextual and data input mistakes, to low operating efficiency, to 
non-accountability (or to external accountability incompatible with coherent 
national policy making and implementation) and to lack of national commitment 
('their' project not 'ours'). These costs are likely to be even more severe 
at sectoral, macro-economic and macro-political economic levels. Strategies 
and their articulation can - up to a point - be imposed on desperate countries 
but they are unlikely to avoid major technical flaws, to be implemented more 
than grudgingly and partially or to yield the intended results of their 
sponsors.
Verbally this reality is widely accepted. In practice it is not. African 
designed stabilisation and recovery programmes have to date received little 
serious external consideration if they have been in the least unorthodox. 
Proposals for external cooperation coordination usually call for donor (not 
jointly) staffed and operated secretariats, lead donor (not national or 
'neutral' agency) convened consultative meetings, lead donor (not joint) 
monitoring of performance of commitments and nature of results. Whether extra 
African individuals and agencies know more about SSA than Africans is open to 
doubt (in some cases and areas perhaps so); that only Africans and African 
bodies are primarily and permanently committed to achieving African 
development and that they will reap the main costs of failure is indisputable.
At least three exceptions which have attracted substantial international 
cooperation now exist to the rule of foreign designed or modelled recovery 
programmes. The first is Zimbabwe which overcame its initial runaway 
boom/multiple drought year crisis of 1982/84 largely on domestically crafted 
lines with the key period after the breakdown of its IMF Agreement (which it 
has, wisely, made no serious attempt to reinstate on the old lines). Deficits 
Zimbabwe has - to a large extent because of defence bills (at home and to 
protect its transport routes in Mozabique) imposed by South African 
aggressiveness - but also a demonstrated ability to respond to both financial
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and food crises, an economic structure in reasonable working order and a 
potentially sustainable 5% real growth rate.
Nigeria has chosen to face the combined hangovers of a busted oil boom and 
riotous overspending without IMF funding and conditionality. That it has 
imposed austerity is not a refutation of that fact - spending in excess of 
production cannot be indefinitely sustained, least of all when export earnings 
fall by over half. The key external need, a debt rescheduling, seems - at 
least for the time being - to be in hand on better than ’normal' terms.
Tanzania negotiated with the Fund and Bank (initially mainly the former, in a 
1985 switch of tactics subsequently primarily the latter) to some effect. Its 
basic goals inform the recovery programme; the austerity elements are at least 
in intent vulnerable group protective; the net import capacity increase is 
uniquely high for a Bank led Structural Adjustment Programme. Against the 
high cost of delay (one might say of democratic process to achieve a consensus 
in Tanzania as much as of finding a route to outflank Fund inflexibilty) needs 
to be set a much greater chance that the programme will prove consistent with 
Tanzania's own goals.
Three showers do not make a rainy season nor three recovery programmes (two in 
very early stages) a return to sustainable growth, let alone development 
benefitting poor people. But these three examples do show that maintenance of 
African goals and - to a large extent - instruments can be combined with 
winning what may turn out to be adequate foreign complementary resources to 
halt and reverse decline. May is the operative word because only too clearly 
some external 'partners' see the present agreements as first steps to 
restoring their ideas of 'sanity', 'normality' and 'free markets' on the 
countries concerned - a danger of which each country's leadership is well 
aware.
This is not to deny the importance of reinforcing African knowledge and 
institutional capacity through transfers of knowledge, technology and 
personnel embodying them to be selected and used by African governments, 
institutions and enterprises. More such transfers are needed albeit with 
better quality control, selectivity, realisation of divergences in national 
needs and absorptive capacity and humility as to capacities and limitations. 
But far more than now they should be chosen by Africans, work within African
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institutional contexts, be meaningfully responsible and accountable to 
Africans and have limited (whether line or staff) autonomous powers. 'Have a 
headache? Take two expatriates.' has worked well as a technico-managerial
capacity prescription for a few SSA states but it is neither generally
practicable nor desirable even in the short run and is inherently dangerously 
addictive. As with other crucial sectors, expatriate personnel are priorities 
for import substitution - and as in respect to most sectors that import
substitution is never likely to, and rarely should, reach 100$.
External finance - as argued above - is not a sufficient condition for turning 
SSA economies around. But for most it is a necessary condition for doing so 
in the forseeable future.
First, the decline in net real external resource transfers to SSA must be
reversed and substantial additional resources deployed in support of 
stabilisation, capacity utilisation and rehabilitation. Second, debt 
rescheduling should be carried out on a basis leading to manageable interest 
and repayment profiles for all external obligations including arrears even if 
this requires extended grace periods, very long repayment schedules, interest 
reductions and/or writeoffs.
Third, resource transfers should be on terms and conditions and for uses 
consistent with the strategies needed for stabilisation - rehabilitation - 
recovery and renewed development. Fourth, because the costs of adjustment 
tend to be "front end loaded" (early) and the gains "back end loaded" 
(lagged), external finance should be used as one means to make the early costs 
sustainable and in particular to protect vulnerable groups.
Fifth, to the extent that substantial additional disbursements are not 
provided, both the amount and duration of rescheduling and the shift of 
emphasis from new capital projects to capacity utilisation, maintenance and 
rehabilitation support will need to be increased.
A Domestic Mirror Image
But what can be said from the stance of an African capital about external 
countries and institutions can from the vantage point of an up country village
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or an urban slum be said about most African governments. Consultation, 
participation, learning from the bottom up, accountability, genuinely 
supporting or getting out of the way of (rather than smothering with 
ill-concealed malice or misplaced good will) community and individual 
initiatives are all uncommon enought to be noted when they do exist - even 
partially and imperfectly.
This it must be underlined is neither an African nor a Southern - and for that 
matter neither a capitalist nor a socialist - failing. It is endemic (in 
different ways) to political, technocratic and enterprise structures and, 
perhaps especially, to most of their operators at the top and even more at 
middle and lower levels. Among intellectuals (whether academic, journalistic 
or consultant) it takes the form of "knowing" what is best for other people's 
"own good" and dismissing their objections as "false consciousness" (a state 
which can exist but is a remarkably good alibi for a range of sins from faulty 
observation to authoritarianism).
Therefore, in one sense the unaccountable use of power and the thrust for 
social, economic and human engineering separated from the concrete knowledge, 
imperatives and energies of the intended beneficiaries has little to do with 
the present crises and overcoming it (which no social, political or economic 
system anywhere has done in full) can hardly be seen as a pre-condition for, 
nor a by-product of, the struggle for renewed development. However, in two 
other senses there are integral links:
a. if people are not merely the means but also the ends, the directors and 
not merely the actors, the judges and not merely the recipients of 
development, then their participation far beyond passive (often only too 
passive when they do not understand or do understand only too well) 
implemenation is essential;
b. with weakened polities, economies and societies there is a very pragmatic 
need for more "peoples participation" in production, service provision 
and self organistation both to lessen burdens on overstretched large 
scale bodies (public and private, directly productive, infrastructural 
and service) and to secure committed, informed support for and action to 
further national policies, programmes and projects.
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How these goals are to be achieved is a complex, contextual issue which cannot 
be addressed adequately in a few paragraphs, a few formulae or a few sweeping 
generalisations. Four guidelines may be of some value.
First, accountability at all levels with the victims of non or mis or 
malfeasance actually able to demand explanations and - if they believe it to 
be appropriate - to remove the non, mis or malfeasor from the position in 
which he has had the power to do harm. This is ultimately a political and 
political economic structural issue with many possible answers as to how.
Second, actually learning from workers, peasants, poor people and women, what 
they perceive their activities, problems and priority needs as being; how they 
would seek to resolve them and what they know about what they do. If a 
village's chief cause of infant mortality is crocodiles it makes little sense 
to insist measles immunisation comes first. If peasants take care to scratch 
(hoe) not turn (plough) the soil there are likely to be very good reasons for 
the choice. This requires both rethinking by experts and a pattern of rules 
and incentives to encourage it.
Third, encouraging individual, community, small group initiatives in the 
social, economic and - broadly defined (i.e. representational and issue 
resolving) - political fields backed by a frame of rules that explicitly makes 
clear that such activities are proper unless stated social evils result (not 
the reverse that they are improper unless specifically licensed). But 
encouraged should not mean co-opted or smother-loved to death. Active support 
needs to be based on careful study of what (beyond getting out of their way) 
such initiatives need in the way of complementary inputs, careful attention to 
what they ask and dialogue on what is to be done.
Fourth, a belief that these aspects of development are serious not sideshows 
nor co-optive or burden disposition devices. To ghettoise them in a low 
status department or ministry is - however well intentioned - likely to have 
precisely the effect of downgrading and marginalising them. The need is for 
their ongoing presence in all aspects of governent, political organisation and 
economic structures - doubtless unequally and in different forms.
As with the somewhat parallel African/external ".interface" this is not to deny 
the value of specialised knowledge, of large institutions or of national
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structures. Measles are a real killer; parents do want to see their children 
live; therefore immunisation is needed and can be based on dialogue and
education not compulsion. More intensive land use does require technical
change to avoid land exhaustion or degredation; peasants are neither blind nor 
unconcerned about falling yields and eroding fields; therefore a dialogue on 
what goals can be furthered by what actions requiring what resources is
perfectly practicable. Macroeconomic policy can only be operated nationally 
and many details of instruments do require specialist knowledge to design or 
use - but the main goals and instruments are perfectly capable of being posed 
in ways allowing informed dialogue and choice by workers and peasants as well 
as by political decision takers.
These elements - recognition of seriousness and urgency, mobilisation,
external resource flows, African involvement and leadership together with 
external acceptance of and respect for it - are in themselves urgent and 
serious. They are elements toward whose construction academics and 
technicians can, at the highest estimate, play only a supporting role.
Toward Realistic Determination
It is necessary to approach the struggle toward agendas for SSA stabilisation 
- rehabilitation - recovery - renewed development with a clear realisation of 
how difficult the task will be and how long it is likely to take. Facile 
hopes - and optimistic projections whether of export growth, external resource 
flows or probable results and dates of gains from domestic policy measures - 
have been one of the banes of both internal and external efforts to date; 
dashed hopes and broken efforts have made the current task all the harder.
However, it is equally necessary (at least for those whose interest is more 
than intellectual) to approach the struggle with a belief that something can 
be achieved, that economic malaise can be overcome and political economic 
development renewed. The belief in powerlessness and the certainty of failure 
are almost always self-validating.
As noted in the overview, most African states, economies and human beings have 
survived. Further they have not done so by sitting still but by struggling 
and by developing survival mechanisms some of which are directly and others
- 3 7 -
partially relevant to the challenges of going beyond survival. The forced 
rethinking of needs, goals, means and priorities has created a wide body of 
ideas and of willingness to attempt changes which - however deplorable the 
context which brought them into being - are a major potential asset in moving 
on from survival to recovery and renewed development.
Both optimism and pessimism are needed but not the optimism of the intellect 
and pessimism of the will which have characterised too many efforts to date. 
What is needed is pessimism of the intellect (including recognition of past 
errors, especially one’s own, and scepticism about the extent of one’s 
knowledge and the present perfection of one’s measures - let alone that or 
those of literally fly-by-night ’experts’) but optimism of the will. At the 
least it is possible still to be among or to stand with those SSA peasants and 
workers, intellectuals and managers, businessmen and civil servants, community 
and political leaders who 'remain undefeated ... because we have gone on 
trying'.
- Reginald Herbold Green 
October 1986
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